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Many encryption algorithms are publicly available to allow cryptographers to analyse and verify the strength of the encryption. Biometric algorithms are not readily available for review and are thus an unknown factor. Biometric algorithms do not generally fulfil the same purpose as cryptographic algorithms. Rather, they represent the encoding rules for the biometric feature ...
Valuable assets are traditionally protected by secrecy, typically secret passwords. Biometric features are often readily observed and do not possess equivalent secrecy. They may also be captured with varying degrees of difficulty. This is a variation on the spoofing concern. It is certainly true that the source biometric features are not secret, but the ...
Mimicry is to behavioural biometrics what artefacts are to physiological biometrics. Through mimicry, an impostor attempts to “copy†the relevant biometric features of an enrolled user in order to fool the biometric authentication process. Because behavioural biometrics are applicable to the recognition of acquired, rather than inherited features, the features can also be acquired ...
Spoofing through the use of artefacts is generally a concern for physiological biometric technologies such as fingerprint, hand, iris etc. Several studies dating from around 1998 have demonstrated the potential for successfully mounting a spoofing attack under carefully controlled conditions. If spoofing attacks can be successful, the fundamental tenet of biometrics – the “something you ...