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Users may be concerned that the use of biometric authentication will increase the danger that they will find themselves targeted by ruthless criminals who are intent on gaining entry to the assets protected by the biometric. With non-biometric authentication, cards, keys, and passwords could be stolen and used by criminals without the presence of ...
This is a sometimes heard expression of concern about the potential misuse of biometric data stored on central databases. It refers to the threat to privacy that such centralised collections of personal data could pose if compromised. Biometric data are regarded as personal data and hence subject to the controls appropriate to personal data. ...
There is sometimes a misapprehension that biometrics can provide absolute identification (e.g. of terrorists, criminals etc) as though the implementation of biometric systems will somehow solve the problem of a major terrorist attack. Of course biometric systems can, at best, only identify/verify individuals who have been previously enrolled. Applications can use this functionality in ...
Mimicry is to behavioural biometrics what artefacts are to physiological biometrics. Through mimicry, an impostor attempts to “copy†the relevant biometric features of an enrolled user in order to fool the biometric authentication process. Because behavioural biometrics are applicable to the recognition of acquired, rather than inherited features, the features can also be acquired ...
Approximately 80% of biometric vendors utilize minutiae in some fashion. Those who do not utilize minutia use pattern matching, which extrapolates data from a particular series of ridges. This series of ridges used in enrolment is the basis of comparison, and verification requires that a segment of the ...